This paper deals with the environmental aspects of the electricity industry in the European
Cet article etudie l'industrie de I'eIectricite dans I'Union Europeenne sous les aspects environnementaux dans Ie contexte des recentes propositions de liberalisation du marche de l'energie eIectrique europeen. Ii discute de ces propositions ainsi que des principales caracteristiques de l'industrie de production d'energie electrique dans Ies fiats membres. Les poIitiques existantes en matiere d'environnement ainsi que celles

Introduction
There was a strong impetus towards integration of the European Union (EU)l in the late 1980s. The ideal of a completely free flow of goods and services, as well as factors of production, within the EU is still not realized, but significant steps forward have been made. The liberalization processes have been accompanied by standardization and harmonization in various areas, including energy and environmental regulations.
Recently, the liberalization initiatives of the European Commission (EC, the "board" of the EU) have been extended to areas where state involvement in economic processes has traditionally been considerable and national markets are sometimes heavily protected, notably traffic, telecommunications and energy. Until now, the progress made with these proposals has been mixed, depending on the strength of the interests involved (vested interests seeing their established power threatened versus new suppliers looking for market opportunities).
This paper deals with one of the liberalization proposals: the draft Directive 2 on common rules for the internal market for electricity. It will look especially at the environmental consequences which the implementation of this Directive could have and at the opportunities for member states and electricity companies to ensure an environment-friendly electricity supply in a liberalized context.
In section 2, the main elements of the draft Directive are presented and the background to the liberalization of the electricity market is considered, including the specific circumstances in some of the member states. Some other elements of EU energy policy are discussed as well.
Section 3 contains a brief review of the energy-related environmental policy in the EU and its member states. The degree to which harmonization of this policy has already taken place, or is likely to occur in the near future, will receive special attention.
The environmental consequences of a free market for electricity are considered in Section 4. As we shall see, these consequences are not straightforward, but depend to a large extent on the conditions under which the liberalization takes place.
Section 5 concludes the article with some suggestions for policy makers who want to secure a "clean" power supply in an institutional and regulatory environment involved in a process of rapid change with an unknown outcome.
The Electricity Sector in the ED and the Liberalization Proposals
The structure of the electricity supply industry in the EU shows large variations among member states. It ranges from a largely cen-2/ A Directive is a piece of ED legislation which has to be implemented by the member states in their national legislation. tralized system in France, with a stateowned, almost monopolistic supplier (EdF), to a recently privatized, reasonably competitive system without any central planning in the UK. Between these extremes, various combinations of types of ownership, planning and organization can be found in the different member states (see McGowan (1993) for an overview).
A similarly large variety is present in the fuels used for power generation, as Table 1 illustrates. These differences partly reflect variations in natural endowments, and partly national policy objectives (such as preference for domestic fuels or diversification). Figure 1 provides some general information on specific features of the electricity industry and policy in each member state.
Until recently, the interference of the EU in the electricity industry has been limited. In the wake of the oil crises in the 1970s, some attempts were made to limit the EU's dependence on imported fuels and to diversify the fuel mix in electricity generation. Furthermore, several programs stimulated the development and application of energy saving technologies and renewables.
In the late 1980s, the drive towards a single internal market gained pace. It became clear that the power suppliers (until then protected by national or regional monopolies) might also become subject to the rules of competition and free trade. The challenge for the electricity industry comes from two sides.
The first consists of a "juridical" route. The EC has started legal action, based on competition rules in the Treaty of the EU, against five member states that maintain monopolies on electricity imports and exports.
Furthermore, several cases have been put before the European Court of Justice, relating to the lack of competition in the electricity sector. In one of these cases, the Court has recently ruled that the "normal" EU competition rules apply to the electricity sector in principle, although they may be tempered when distribution companies are entrusted with public service duties (such as the obligation to provide electricity to all consumers in a region at uniform tariffs) (Hancher, 1994) . Belgium: Electricity supply is dominated by one private firm, Electrabel. The other large producer, stateowned SPE, is increasing its market share. Power supply is largely nuclear, but there is now a moratorium on new capacity. The share of coal is gradually declining, and imported coal is now being used; expenSive domestic coal production has ceased. New power plants under construction are all gas-fired. Cogeneration is becoming more popular, giving rise to joint ventures between indusby and public utilities.
Denmark: Denmark has 12 regional production companies, owned by the distributors. The two transmission companies, Elkraft and Elsam, are influential in investment planning. Electricity production is largely co81-based, but natural gas and renewables are expected to grow. The government is stimulating CHP (including a further increase in the already extensive district heating networks).
France: Electricite de France is the (almost) monopolistic power producer, transporter and distributor. It is state-owned and its planning decisions are under government control. A large nuclear program has been implemented in the past 20 years. Surplus baseload power is now being exported to many countries. New capacity being planned is also largely nuclear, although gas will gain in importance. Despite its position as a net exporter, France is opposed to liberalization of the European electricity market. Nonetheless, EdF is very active abroad, including in Eastern European countries.
Germany:
The electricity sector includes a very large number of firms, both state-owned and private. Among these, there are some very large power producers, such as RWE, PreussenElektra and Bayemwerk. German power production is to a large extent based on subsidized domestic coal. Lignite is still the dominant fuel in the former GDR, but many lignite-fired plants are being closed down for environmental and efficiency reasons. Nuclear energy is quite controversial and decisions on the construction of new nuclear plants have been postponed. As German electricity prices are the highest in the EU, the large power consumers are much in favour of TPA, whereas the German producers are opposed. The latter, however, are actively involved in trans-frontier activities.
Greece: The state-owned Public Power Corporation is completely vertically integrated (its activities range from mining to electricity distribution) and controls most of the Greek electricity system. The share of coal and (domestic) lignite in power generation, as well as gas (to be imported from Russia and Algeria), is increasing, that of oil decreasing. Greece aims at closer links with the other EU countries. Presently it has no cmmection with the UCPTE power grid, but a planned underwater cable will link the Greek system with Italy.
Ireland:
The state-owned Electricity Supply Board is responsible for production, transmission and distribution. It is presently undergoing a restructuring and will lose its generation monopoly. Power generation used to be quite inefficient (peat being an important fuel), but nowadays the fuel mix is more diversified and efficiency has grown. The feasibility of a connection between the Irish electricity grid and the British one is under consideration.
Italy:
The major player on the Italian energy scene is ENEL, which is still state-owned but in a process of privatization. ENEL has a monopoly over export, import and distribution r and coordinates generation and distribution. Italy is a large net importer of electricity. Nuclear power has been abandoned, and half of the electricity generation is now based on oil. The share of gas is expected to increase strongly. Since 1990, there has been some room for independent producers to offer their (surplus) power to the public grid.
Luxembourg: Luxembourg has hardly any production capacity and is therefore mainly depending on imports of electricity. There are some small-scale hydroelectric and cogeneration plants.
Netherlands: There are four regional production companies, taking care of large scale production. Together they own SEP, which is responisble for transmission and investment planning, and has a de facto import monopoly. Domestically produced gas is likely to remain the major fuel, as gas-based CHP projects (often initiated jointly by industry and distribution companies) are booming. The nuclear option is presently politically unfeasible. "Clean" coal technologies may also playa role in the future. A 250 MW pilot coal gasification plant has been started recently.
Portugal:
The formerly state-owned company EdP (now partly privatized) owns most of the production capacity and has a monopoly over import and transmission. The government is encouraging independent producers to participate in the system. Foreign electricity companies are participating in the construction of new power plants. Portuguese electricity demand is the fastest growing in the EU. The share of oil in power generation is expected to fall; that of gas to increase. hnports (mainly from France and Spain) will also grow. Together with the UK, the Portuguese government is a firm supporter of TPA.
Spain:
The electricity industry is to a large extent privately owned. There are a few large production companies, of which Iberdrola and ENDESA are the most important ones. Many distribution companies are linked to these producers, but legislation is being drafted to separate generation and distribution. REDESA controls transmission and imports. New coal-fired capacity is presently under construction, including an IGCC (coal gasification) plant. The share of gas is expected to grow, at the expense of nuclear power.
United Kingdom: Since 1990, the UK electricity industry has been liberalised and (largely) privatised. Two private companies, National Power and PowerGen, now dominate conventional large scale production, but nuclear capacity is still state-owned. Transmission (including the operation of a 'wholesale market' for electricity) takes place through the National Grid Company, and distribution is by 12 Regional Electricity Companies. Electricity production is still tightly bound by contracts to domestic coal production, but investments in new generation capacity (including those by independent producers) are almost exclusively gas-based (the 'dash for gas'). Power production based on non-fossil fuels (including nuclear power) is being subsidized by a 'fossil fuel levy' on all electricity sold, The UK is a strong supporter of the electricity market reforms proposed by the European Commission. (Main sources: lEA (1993), and McGowan (1993) .)
The second and possibly more powerful threat to the sheltered markets of the electricity industry is the regulatory route. The EC has drafted several regulations, of which the most important is the proposed Directive for Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity (CEC, 1991 (CEC, /1993 . Initially, this proposal implied full competition at the production level and access to the transmission and distribution networks for all producers and large consumers on reasonable conditions ("Third Party Access", TPA). These proposals have met with a lot of criticism, both from most of the member countries and from public utilities. The arguments used against competition and (especially) TPA mainly related to the fear that long-term investments would be discouraged and security of supply would become endangered. The European Parliament asked the Commission to harmonize rules in the areas of taxation and environment (thus creating a "level playing field") before embarking on liberal-
ization.
The EC presented its revised proposal on December 7, 1993. In this new draft, member states have the opportunity of maintaining a kind of central planning of production capacity, by opting for a system in which the necessary production capacity is determined centrally, and is open for tendering on the basis of objective and non-discriminating criteria. These criteria may include, among others, environmental demands and the type of fuels to be used. Furthermore, a system of "full" TPA will not be introduced. Instead, the draft Directive proposes negotiations between the prospective user and the manager of the transmission or distribution network. Of course, the network manager may not abuse his power in these negotiations. But it is clear that this "negotiated" TPA offers more opportunities to refuse access (in particular, if it would make it impossible for the network operator to fulfil his "public service" obligations regarding the security, regularity, quality, and price of power supplies). The EC proposals were discussed by the ED energy ministers last May, but an agreement has not yet been reached.
Erivironmental policy regarding the electricity sector in the ED
Since 1986, the Treaty of the ED has provided for a common environmental policy. Nevertheless, large differences between the member states continue to exist. Several factors account for this: • common rules exist only for a limited number of environmental issues; • member states often are allowed to apply more stringent requirements than the ED standards ("minimum harmonisation"); • the ED regulations often allow for exemptions and transitional periods;
• member states do not always implement ED regulations promptly or enforce them adequately.
Regarding the electricity industry, the major environmental concern is air pollution, especially due to £he use of fossil fuels. In £he 1980s, £he focus was mainly on the acidifying substances S02 and NOx. In 1988, £he ED adopted the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD), which defined emission limits for these two substances for new plants, as well as overall emission reduction targets. The LCPD is due to be revised shortly, taking into account the outcomes of the new S02 protocol, as agreed upon in Geneva. A new LCPD will probably also contain standards for existing plant, and will tighten £he limits for new plant according to Best Available Technology (BAT). Presently, large differences exist between member states regarding the treatment of existing plants. The northernmost ED countries (especially Germany) have already implemented a costly emission reduction program, whereas other countries have hardly invested anything in pollution abatement at existing power plants (see Figure 2) .
In recent years, the attention of environmental policy makers has shifted to the "greenhouse gases," in particular C02. The EC aims at stabilizing CO 2 emissions by the year 2000 at £he 1990 levels. This objective is quite a challenge, as "autonomous" growth in this period is projected at 11% (Leydon, 1994) . Here again, £here are large differences in the objectives and strategies of £he various member states (see Figure 2) .
The policy of the ED regarding CO 2 reduction primarily aims at stimulating energy conservation and improving energy efficiency Belgium: In 1991, the electricity producers Electrabel and SPE entered into an agreement with the authorities on the reduction of acidifying emissions. In the period 1980-2003, S02 emissions will have to be reduced by 80-85% and NO x emissions by 40-45%. These targets can quite easily be achieved because of the growth of nuclear capacity in the 1980s and the increasing role of gas in the 1990s. Specific environment-oriented measures only playa modest role in the fulfilment of the emission reductions.
For C02, a 5% emission reduction target over the period 1990-2000 has been 'established in 1991. Whereas this objective is not very likely to be reached for the economy as a whole, the electricity sector will probably be able to comply with it, again due to the increasing role of gas at the expense of coal in power generation.
Denmark:
The latest targets for the reduction of acidifying emissions from power stations are 77% for S02 and 50% for NO x over the period 1980-2000. These figures seem to be attainable by upgrading some FGDs, limits on sulphur in coal, and by substitution of gas for coal.
The 'Energy 2000' plan calls for an ambitious 20% C02 emission reduction from fossil fuel use over the period [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Energy consumption (including electricity) is heavily taxed in Denmark, and the taxes are partly based on carbon content. CHP, natural gas, biomass and wind energy are being encouraged. Electricity suppliers are active on the demand side to promote energy conservation by way of providing information, financing and subsidies.
France: Due to the large share of nuclear power, emissions from power plants in France are already relatively low. Nevertheless, in January 1993, EdF signed a protocol with the Minister of Energy containing measures to reduce S02 a..,d NO x emissions at some fossil fuel fired plants.
For C02, the French policy objective is stabilisation at the 1990 leveL In the electricity sector, this is to be attained by investments in new nuclear plant, hydro and renewables, as well as by means of demand side management.
Germany: During the 1980s Germany invested heavily in S02 and NO x abatement at power plants. Over the years 1984-1992, some 20 billion DMarks were spent on air pollution in the electricity sector. By mid-1996, all power stations in the former GDR will also be retrofitted with FGD and NO x reducing devices. In this way, Germany will be able to comply with its international emission reduction obligations.
A 25% reduction of C02 emissions is being aimed at over the period [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Part of this can be realized relatively easily by improving the very poor energy efficiency in the eastern part of the country. A national C02 tax will be introduced, independent of ED decisions on the matter. Furthermore, a comprehensive program, covering a wide range of CO2 reduction options has been started. The electricity producers want to contribute by using higWy efficient generation techniques, expanding nuclear capacity, and importing hydropower from Norway.
Greece: Under the LCPD, Greece is allowed some increase in S02 and NO x emissions over the 1980 levels, because of its relatively backward economic position in the EU. New power plants, however, have to comply with the emission limits of the Directive.
Regarding C02, no official national policy objectives exist, but a general increase in emissions by 25% over the period 1990-2000 is foreseen. The PPC expects an increase from electricity production by 27% over the same period, while production itself will grow by 44%. This relatively limited C02 increase is due to the anticipated growth in the share of gas, hydropower and renewables in electricity generation.
Ireland: To reduce S02 emissions from electricity generation, ESB resorts to the use of low-sulphur fuels. NO x reduction is achived through the installation of low-NOx-bumers on all new, and some existing coal and gas fired plant.
The Irish C02 abatement strategy, published in 1992, aims at limiting the growth of C02 emissions between 1990 and 2000 to 20%. ESB has limited opportunities for C02 reduction, as it has no access to nuclear power or electricity import, hydro potential has already been fully utilized, the share of gas is already high, and it is required to continue the use of a certain amount of peat. Nevertheless, it is running supply side (including a 6.45 MW wind farm) and demand side energy efficiency programs.
Italy:
The Italian utilities are implementing a program to abate acidifying emissions from power plants, induding more expensive measures such as FGD and SCR at some existing plant. The emissions of S02 are expected to decrease by 67% betvveen 1990 and 2000, those of NO x by 30%.
Italy has agreed in principle to stabilize its C02 emissions in 2000 at the 1990 levels. ENEL aims at limiting the growth of its C02 emissions betvveen 1990 and 2000 to 19%, while expecting a 40% growth in electricity production over the same period. Apart from reshuffling fossil fuel input (more gas), demand side measures are taken and the use of hydro and geothermal power will be intensified.
Luxembourg: Given its small electricity production sector, Luxembourg has few opportunities for realizing emission reductions at the supply side directly. The CO 2 targets (stabilization in 2000 at the 1990 level and reduction in 2005 by 20%) are to be reached by means of stimulating energy efficiency, renewables, and CHP.
Netherlands: An agreement between SEP and the government, signed in 1990, should lead to 502 and NO x emissions in 2000 being 90% and 60% lower respectively than in 1980. The agreement includes investments in FGD at a Polish lignite-fired power plant.
The Dutch government aims at reducing C02 emissions in 2000 by 3-5% compared with the 1989/90 levels. The electricity sector expects that it can stabilize C02 emissions in 2010 at the 1990 level, despite a 40% growth in electricity demand. Apart from measures like efficiency improvement, energy saving and CHP, SEP also has started to compensate for CO 2 emissions by reforestation programs abroad.
Dutch distribution companies run their own environmental program, financed in part by a charge on electricity bills. A growth of C02 emissions over the period 1990-2000 by 30-40% is foreseen, due to rapid economic expansion. Although the Portuguese electricity industry will take several measures for improving energy efficiency and the use of renewables, the government considers the growth in greenhouse gas emissions justified with a view to the relative backward position of the Portuguese economy in comparison with other EU countries.
Spain: The National Energy Plan (PEN-91) aims at reducing S02 emissions from large combustion plants by 42% over the period 1980-2000, and at reducing NO x emissions to 263 kilotons. These targets go beyond the LCPD requirements. Apart from measures like 10w-NO x burners and low-sulphur fuels, Spain invests in cleaner coal technologies, such as fluidized bed combustion and coal gaSification.
A 25% growth in C02 emissions over the period 1990-2000 is envisaged for the Spanish economy. PEN-91 contains a Plan for Energy Savings and Efficiency, including a larger role for gas, renewabies and cogeneration in electricity production.
United Kingdom: With the privatization of the electricity industry, both major producers of 'conventional' power (National Power and PowerGen) were obliged to retrofit 4000 MW of coal plant with FGD equipment. This is presently being implemented, although part of the program may be cancelled because the rapid substitution of gas for coal is already reducing 502 emissions drastically. Furthermore, some of the larger coal plants are being equipped with 10w-NO x burners. The UK's objective for C02 is to bring emissions in the year 2000 back to the 1990 levels. The introduction of VAT on residential fuel and power is expected to contribute to energy saving. Furthermore, the government aims at 1500 MW electricity generating capacity based on renewables in the year 2000. Presently only 5% of the proceeds from the fossil fuel levy is spent on renewables (the other 95% go to nuclear power), but this percentage should increase.
(Main sources: lEA (1993); UNIPEDE (1994).) through a number of programs and funds, such as JOULE, SAVE, and THERMIE. The ALTENER program is meant to promote the use of non-C0 2 emitting fuels, in particular bio-fuels. Within 10 years, the share of renewables in electricity production should triple to 8%.
These measures are not sufficient to achieve the stabilization objective. The EC has therefore taken the initiative to introduce a combined carbon/energy tax. This tax should be introduced in steps, reaching a final level of 0.7 ECU/GJ and 9.4 ECU per ton of CO 2 in the year 2000. 3 Electricity from small hydropower plants and renewables would not be taxed. However, power produced by large hydro and nuclear plants, although not leading to CO 2 emissions, would be subject to the tax. The EC obviously does not want to favour these generation options too much, as they have their own environmental and safety risks. Exempting nuclear power from the tax would also have been politically unfeasible, as it would have benefited the countries with the most nuclear power (France and Belgium) too much.
In order to protect the competitiveness of energy-intensive European industry, the introduction of the C02/energy tax has been made dependent on similar measures in other OECD countries (primarily the US and Japan). Therefore, even in the improbable case of agreement on the tax among EU member states, its actual adoption in the near future is still very unlikely. Individual member states then may decide to introduce their own tax (some of them have already done so), but competition considerations will lead them to confine such a tax to households and other small users.
Impact of Liberalization on the Environment
Environmentalists are generally concerned about the environmental consequences of trade liberalization. They fear that the economic 3/ One European Currency Unit (ECU) is currently worth about 1.21 US$. growth which it creates will lead to increased pollution. Moreover, they expect governments to become more reluctant to impose stringent environmental requirements on industries which are confronted with international competition. Protagonists of free trade, on the other hand, maintain that economic growth is a prerequisite for society to be able to afford environmental measures, and that competition leads to efficient allocation, including efficient allocation of scarce natural resources (provided the prices of these resources take internal as well as external costs into account). Both lines of argument have surrounded the recently concluded GAIT negotiations.
In the particular case of trade liberalization in electricity, the same basic views are being expressed, as well as some specific arguments which relate to the special character of the good concerned.
As a first result of introducing competition on the European electricity market, one might expect lower prices and smaller price differences between the member states (see Table  2 for price levels in 1990). This outcome seems contrary to the EC policy of reducing energy consumption and CO 2 emissions by means of higher energy prices (to be brought about by the CO 2 / energy tax). However, two qualifications apply here.
First, it is not clear whether substantial price decreases may be expected after liberalization. These are only likely if major efficiency improvements could be realized, or if electricity 'dumping' could take place (Le., offering low prices to large consumers at the expense of 'captive clients'). Neither of these outcomes is likely. There are no indications that the European electricity industry is operating in a very inefficient way at the moment. Technical innovations generally get implemented rapidly (although it takes a very long time for their full potential to become utilized, given the long life-span of power plants). Only the use of expensive domestic coal in Germany and the UK causes unnecessary high costs, but these are largely compensated for by means of subsidies which 2/ including VAT Source: Calculations based on EUROSTAT will disappear under a liberalized regime. 4 And dumping of electricity will undoubtedly not be tolerated once the free market takes shape.
Second, although high energy prices may help in reducing energy consumption, it is questionable whether this would be desirable if the high prices were the result of inefficiencies at the production side. Rather than being an argument to maintain protected national electricity markets, the need for higher energy prices would call for linking the liberalization and the introduction of the C02/energy tax.
Differences in electricity prices between countries will remain in a competitive European market. One reason for this may be the existence of differences in environmental demands. All large new plants in the ED member states have to comply with the LCPD, but as we have seen, some countries go beyond the LCPD requirements and have also applied emission abatement at existing plants, the 4/ It is often suggested that the French nuclear program is also only viable thanks to government support (see, for instance, The Economist, 2 February 1991), but this is denied by EdF. 234 cost of which will be felt for many years to come. Furthermore, some countries will introduce energy and/or carbon taxes (or have already done so), whereas others are obstructing the plans to do so at the ED level. In short, a fully harmonized environmental policy with regard to the electricity sector in the ED is not to be expected in the near future.
Could the resulting price differences lead to a massive relocating of power producers to those countries with the least stringent demands, once the barriers for electricity trade have been removed? This does not seem very likely. First, large differences in environmental standards exist between ED member states regarding several other industries. This has not led to large migration streams of polluting industries to the countries with the most lenient standards. Apparently other location factors are much stronger. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the large-scale settlement of power plants producing only for export would be acceptable for the local population. A counter-movement would emerge, leading to a decrease of the differences in environmental demands. Finally, one has to take into account that transport costs may compensate part of the environmental cost differences.
Another effect of a free electricity market could be a shift in the fuel mix used for electricity generation. It is sometimes argued that competition will lead to a shift from capital-intensive, long-term investments to the use of technologies with short payback periods. This may turn out to be environmentally benign (as in the case of substituting gas for coal),5 but the opposite may as well be true. Risky investments in low-emission technologies, such as nuclear power and coal 5/ The desirability of the recent 'dash for gas' (which is, as we have seen, also occurring in most of the non-liberalizing ED countries) is sometimes questioned, because of possible future scarcity. On the other hand, it can be argued that this scarcity is not very likely to occur soon, given the huge reserves in Russia. Moreover, an eventual growing scarcity of natural gas will be reflected in higher prices, which in tum diminishes the competitive advantage of gas for power generation in the longer run. gasification, are less likely to occur in a liberalized market (unless there is some form of government support). Renewables could also find themselves at a competitive disadvantage. Under the latest version of the EC proposal, the electricity network manager may give priority to renewables, waste and CHP, but is not obliged to do so. In the absence of a CO 2 / energy tax, electricity from renewables will probably not flourish without additional support or regulations (such as the Non Fossil Fuel Obligation in the UK).
Will electricity suppliers under a competitive system still be inclined to promote energy saving, as many of them are doing under the present, sheltered conditions? At first sight, it seems that a profit maximizing (or at least loss avoiding) firm has no interest in reducing its turnover. However, it is often argued that it is not kiloWatt-hours the customers are interested in, but rather energy services. This may be true, but it presupposes that the customer is not fully aware of energy saving opportunities. In other words, it extends the role of the electricity supplier to information supply. In any case, given a certain production capacity in a free market, there is a natural tendency to use that capacity to the maximum possible extent. Under competitive conditions, electricity companies will not differ fundamentally from say oil companies. This could mean that their involvement in energy saving will be taken over by the suppliers of electric and electronic appliances and equipment: much the same as research and marketing on fuel efficiency of cars is now mainly being done by the car producers, not by the oil companies. This example suggests that improvements in energy efficiency are not necessarily dependent on the energy supplier. Rather, under the present conditions the producers of lowenergy goods can be said to benefit from the 'free' marketing (and sometimes even subsidies) provided for them by utilities.
A final remark regards the impact of changes in property relationships, often associated with market liberalization. If privatization accompanies the liberalization, governments will have a less direct influence on the electricity sector's decision making. Whether or not this is bad for the environment depends on the present situation. Whereas the authorities now sometimes use their position to impose relatively stringent demands on the electricity sector, under the privatization scheme they will have to treat it like a 'normal' industry. On the other hand, it might well be conceivable that the new property relationships increase the distance between governments and electricity industries, making the former more prepared to enforce environmental regulations than in a situation where they themselves have an interest in the industry.
Conclusions
Whether liberalization of the electricity market is good or bad for the environment seems to be an academic and not really relevant question in present-day Europe. First, it is very unlikely that a genuinely competitive electricity market will emerge in the ED in the next one or two decades. Moreover, any moves towards competition will no doubt be accompanied by conditions to ensure the protection of the environment (as well as several other social concerns, such as security of supply for 'captive clients'). In other words, liberalization will probably lead to more regulation; not only to ensure that the market functions efficiently and equitably, but also to enforce the conditions under which suppliers are allowed to operate.
Whatever the outcome of the present liberalization proposals, markets for electricity in Europe will change and probably become more lively. A major reason for this is that the traditional economies of scale in electricity production are becoming less important. For instance, combined heat and power (cogeneration) is sweeping the market nowadays. As this happens to be a relatively energy-efficient and environmentally friendly technology, it is being stimulated by many authorities by way of favourable conditions for access to the power network. The same is true for renewables, although their competitive position is still much weaker. The increasing supply of electricity from small, independent producers disturbs the traditionallong-term planning process by the large monopolistic utilities. They will have to find a new way of incorporating the less predictable supply from small scale sources. Many of them have already realized this and are ready to accept the concept of 'integrated resource planning,' which has been established in the US for several years (Flavin and Lenssen, 1994) . The additional uncertainties of introducing competition on the demand side (Third Party Access) are much harder to digest for them.
Although a free electricity market as such is not a threat to the environment, one should be aware of the fact that at present many electricity producers and distributors are environment-friendly, a role they might have to give up once competition gets really tough. On the producer side, large sums are presently invested in R&D and demonstration projects on various forms of 'clean' generation technologies, such as coal gasification (IGCC). Many distribution companies run schemes prOViding support for energy conservation by their customers. Should a free market eventually become a reality, the rationale for carrying on these will no longer self-evident. Maybe they will be taken over by others, such as the suppliers of generation technology and appliances. But governments will probably have to playa role as well in providing information and stimulating energy conservation.
Finally, regardless of the liberalization process, it is clear that any attempt at reducing the use of (fossil fuel-based) electricity is bound to fail if energy prices remain at their present low level. Given the abundance of fossil fuel reserves, the only way to sub-stantially increase their prices for consumers is by introducing some kind of tax. And given the low price elasticity for energy, this tax would have to be considerable. The prospects for such a tax becoming a reality in the EU (let alone in all OECD countries) are not particularly bright.
